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Note
PROTECTING THE SEASONAL ARTS:
FASHION DESIGN, COPYRIGHT LAW,
AND THE VIABILITY OF THE INNOVATIVE DESIGN
PROTECTION & PIRACY PREVENTION ACT
MEAGHAN MCGURRIN EHRHARD
The Innovative Design Protection & Piracy Prevention Act of 2011
(“IDPPPA”) crafts a sui generis form of copyright protection for fashion
designs. The IDPPPA is not a revolutionary attempt for the U.S.
Congress; it is instead a reflection of the fashion industry’s unique history,
the fashion industry’s unique economics, decades of heated academic
debate, scores of previous legislative drafts, and hours of testimony during
Congressional hearings. This Note argues that copyright protection
should be extended to fashion designs, and that a viable extension of such
protection is possible through the IDPPPA with two modifications. This
conclusion is first supported by an analysis of the industry’s legal history;
taken as a whole, this survey places in stark relief the arguments against
blatant copying that have remained unchanged for over a century. This
conclusion is also supported by an analysis of the economic and policy
arguments that polarize the debate regarding the merits of protection.
This Note strives to reconcile this debate—and quell the storm—with a
succinct definition for “fashion” (the actual good that copyright law would
protect), a definite and viable temporal window for copyright protection,
and a reconciliation of the policy preoccupations that have continued to
divide Congress and the fashion industry’s designers. This Note concludes
with a review of the IDPPPA, suggestions for the further alleviations of
critics’ fears, and a call to Congress to finally recognize American fashion
designs as protectable art.
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PROTECTING THE SEASONAL ARTS:
FASHION DESIGN, COPYRIGHT LAW,
AND THE VIABILITY OF THE INNOVATIVE DESIGN
PROTECTION & PIRACY PREVENTION ACT
MEAGHAN MCGURRIN EHRHARD
I. INTRODUCTION
A bill is currently pending in the U.S. House of Representatives that
has the potential to extend copyright protection into an industry that has
historically operated outside of the framework of American intellectual
property law; consequently, the innovators of this industry have had to
create and market their wares within an environment branded by blatant
copying. Titled the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention
Act (“IDPPPA”), H.R. 2511 carves into the United States Code a sui
generis form of copyright protection for fashion designs.1 For the first time
in American history, the creations of fashion designers would be eligible
for copyright protection and fashion designers would have a sword against
the notorious knock-offs that plague the industry.2 Furthermore, an



The University of Chicago, B.A. 2009; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D.
Candidate 2013. I would like to thank Professor Steven Wilf for his advice, his edits, and his ability to
organize my thoughts better than I personally could. I would also like to thank my parents, RoseAnn
and Lawrence Ehrhard, for the understanding that when fashions fade, more than style is eternal.
1
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011).
Hearings for H.R. 2511 were held on July 13, 2011 and the bill is currently awaiting official report
from the House Committee on the Judiciary. Bill Overview of H.R. 2511, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2511 (last visited October 1, 2012).
2
The only intellectual property protection currently available for fashion design is trademark and
(very rarely) design patent. See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 121–23 (Peter K. Yu, ed. 2007)
(summarizing the availability and practical application of other IP regimes to fashion design). The
ineffectiveness of these available regimes is a primary motivation for the IDPPPA. See Innovative
Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property,
Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1–2 (2011) (prepared
statement of Rep. Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the
Internet) [hereinafter Statement of Rep. Goodlatte] (summarizing the current state of intellectual
property protection and concluding “[t]hus, a thief violates Federal law when he steals a creator’s
design, reproduces and sells that article of clothing, and attaches a fake label to the garment for
marketing purposes. But it is perfectly legal for that same thief to steal the design, reproduce the article
of clothing, and sell it, provided he does not attach a fake label to the finished product. This loophole
allows pirates to cash in on the sweat equity of others and prevents designers in our country from
reaping a fair return on their creative investments.”).
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American industry with annual sales of almost $230 billion would be
afforded a form of intellectual property protection comparable to that
offered in the other fashion capitals of the world.4
The IDPPPA is the culmination of a 130 year movement by the fashion
design industry to achieve a place within the American intellectual
property framework. This history is marked by an inability to prevail over
industry opponents before Congress, an incapacity to articulate a viable
cause of action against copyists in the Courts, and practical and legal
hurdles that have prevented the implementation of internal remedies. This
is because fashion design is inherently difficult to reconcile practically
with intellectual property law: An exact definition of the good we seek to
encourage, “fashion,” is elusive and prone to multiple interpretations; the
temporal window for the life of a fashion design is fleeting and cyclical;
and finally, knockoffs within the industry are productive because they
disseminate fashionable clothing to the masses, and yet are unproductive
for the actual designers (the true innovators) within the industry. These
contrarian characteristics of the fashion industry are what led Coco Chanel
to observe: “Fashion should slip out of your hands. The very idea of
protecting the seasonal arts is childish. One should not bother to protect
that which dies the minute it was born.”5
The IDPPPA is a viable solution toward overcoming these intellectual
barriers that have historically blocked the extension of intellectual property
protection to fashion design. It crafts a definition of protectable designs
that can reconcile the competing interests of designers, retailers, and
consumers. The IDPPPA also creates a cause of action for infringement
against only blatant copyists, thus encouraging innovation and
dissemination of trends. Furthermore, the IDPPPA’s three-year window of
protection is specifically tailored to the transitory lifetime of a fashion
design.
3
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CB12-03, ADVANCE MONTHLY SALES FOR RETAIL & FOOD
SERVICES, DEC. 2011 (2012). This revenue is larger than that of music, books, and movies combined.
See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1147, 1148 & n.1 (2009) (comparing the revenue of fashion to those of other industries afforded
copyright protection).
4
For example, the European Union currently provides three years of protection for unregistered
fashion designs, with five years of protection available if the designer chooses to register his design.
Council Regulation 6/2002, art. 11 and 12, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 5 (EC); see also Laura C. Marshall, Note,
Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should Adopt a Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition
Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305, 318–319 (2007) (describing the current protections available in the
United Kingdom and France); Susanna Monseau, European Design Rights: A Model for the Protection
of All Designers from Piracy, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 27, 56–62 (2011) (describing in detail the European
Union scheme for design protection).
5
Lynsey Blackmon, Comment, The Devil Wears Prado: A Look at the Design Piracy Prohibition
Act and the Extension of Copyright Protection to the World of Fashion, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 107, 112
(2007) (quoting Coco Chanel).
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Part II of this Note will outline the disheartening history of the
American fashion design industry’s struggle to thwart copyists in
Congress, the Courts, and via internal self-policing. The purpose of this
Part is to present what pernicious effects of copying have remained
unchanged for over a century, and what remedies have proven to be viable
solutions to these unchanging problems. Part III will analyze the reasons
why fashion designs are difficult to conceptually reconcile with intellectual
property law. In particular, this Part will address three conceptual hurdles:
first, articulating a precise definition of “fashion” for the purpose of
discerning what should be protected under copyright law; second,
reconciling the problem of public choice in that copyists both stifle
innovation within the fashion design industry and yet promote the
democratization of fashion for the American public at large; and third,
articulating a temporal window of protection for a design that is both
fleeting and cyclical. The purpose of Part III is to detail what legal
remedies are feasible options for the unique demands of the industry. Part
IV will critique the IDPPPA, specifically. The purpose of this Part is to
articulate why the IDPPPA is a feasible remedy for fashion designers
against blatant copyists, and also an exciting opportunity for an industry
marked by pessimism.
II. FASHIONING A SYSTEM OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
FOR FASHION DESIGN: A HISTORY
The IDPPPA is not Congress’s first attempt to extend American
intellectual property law to fashion designs. The IDPPPA is the
culmination of a 130 year movement within the fashion industry to seek
redress in Congress, the American court system, and internally within the
industry itself against the pernicious effects of blatant copyists. The
IDPPPA is crafted in accordance with this extensive history; it embraces
the successes of this past—particularly the fashion industry’s attempt at
self-regulation during the early twentieth century—while striving to
alleviate those flaws that continually thwarted the success of past
proposals. An analysis of this history will present what problems have and
have not changed within the fashion industry and present what remedies
can only be provided through Congressional action.
A. The Rise of Western Fashion in France and England, and the
Intellectual Property Protection That Accompanied this Ascension
The twentieth century saw the rise of many metropolitan fashion
capitols (such as New York, Chicago, London and Antwerp) yet Paris has
nevertheless managed to maintain its pinnacle position within the industry.
France has an early history of protecting its design industries with
intellectual property law. A thriving silk industry in Lyons led to formal
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recognition of a property right in a silk design by Louis XV in 1737, and
this property right was extended to silk manufacture, generally, under
Louis XVI in 1787.6 Louis XVI’s decree also established a system of
efficiently protecting this property right; the decree established a bureau of
design registration, fixed terms of protection, and imposed penalties for
copying and selling counterfeits.7 Notably, the French government paused
during the turmoil of revolution to expand this copyright to all “industrial
arts” in 1793, thus implicating the importance of the right to the country as
a whole.8 Napoleon continued this legal tradition and further defined the
scope of the fashion designer’s right by creating commercial courts and
developing compulsory arbitration for infringement suits.9 French law
ultimately provided exclusive rights for up to three years.10
The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of modern haute couture in
Paris.11 Early twentieth-century advocates of copyright protection for
American fashion design observed that “art [is] an economic history of the
practical French” and linked Paris’s ascension to its early recognition of
the economic nature of industrial design, its categorization of industrial
design as protectable art, and its dedication to providing adequate
protection for that art.12 As described by one scholar: “The steady steps
whereby France nourished beauty made Paris a synonym for elegance. Art
flourished in a hospitable climate. There was nothing racial about it; no
gift especially French.”13 Today, France continues to provide the strongest
legal protection for fashion design and its capital continues to hold its title
as the fashion capital of the world.14
A form of copyright protection similar to the French system came to
England approximately fifty years later via the British Designs Act of
1839.15 This Act provided for copyright registration of the original designs
of new patterns and shapes for any article of manufacture, and it provided
protection for a term of twelve months.16 While this Act included designs
in fabrics, it excluded linen and cotton.17 Nevertheless, British linen and
cotton manufacturers continued to work for legal protection, observing:
[Piracy] interrupts and damages the entire economy of his
6

SYLVAN GOTSHAL, THE PIRATES WILL GET YOU 18–19 (1945).
Id. at 19.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 20.
11
Scafidi, supra note 2, at 117.
12
GOTSHAL, supra note 6, at 18.
13
Id. at 19.
14
Scafidi, supra note 2, at 117.
15
GOTSHAL, supra note 6, at 21.
16
Id.
17
Id.
7
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business . . . destroying the demand for those articles on
whose sale [the creator] relied to meet his payments—and
undermining the confidence of his customers in his house by
having imitations of his goods thrown into the market at
lower prices than he had already supplied them.18
Legal acquiescence of this behavior is “to the prejudice of the art, as
well as of the employment which would naturally be given to men of talent
in design.”19 They denied opponents’ counterargument that the industry
would economically falter should competitors be barred from copying,
responding that “[a]ny printer desirous of competing with the proprietor of
a successful design would still be competent to direct an artist to imitate it
in style though not in identical pattern.”20 This exact analysis continues to
be articulated by the American proponents for intellectual property
protection for fashion designs.21
The European Union today provides up to twenty-five years of
protection for registered qualifying designs, and up to three years of
protection for unregistered qualifying designs.22 Design rights extend to
furniture, textiles, interior design, and any other creative industries in
which there is a design element.23 This right encompasses fashion
designs.24
B. The American Fashion Industry’s Extensive Attempts to Achieve
Similar Protection in the United States
There is currently no statutory intellectual property protection for
fashion designs in the United States. The fashion industry has tried, and
failed, to achieve protection through proposed Acts in Congress, through
litigation in court, and through the establishment of a self-regulating Guild.
All of these attempts proved to be futile.
1. Attempts to Fit Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion Design
into the American Statutory Framework
It was the silk industry that made the first call for copyright protection
18

Id. at 23.
Id.
20
Id. at 24.
21
See, e.g., Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 14 (2011) (oral statement of Prof. Jeannie Suk) [hereinafter Oral Statement of Jeannie
Suk] (“Current knockoff sellers would need to adapt their businesses to focus on selling inspired-bys
instead. They would have to innovate and invest somewhat in design rather than only replicate others’
work in full.”).
22
Monseau, supra note 4, at 60–61.
23
Id. at 57.
24
Id.
19
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in the United States—albeit at a much later date than its French
counterpart. Beginning in 1882, the “old Silk Association of America
rallied its members to indignation and frustration meetings.”25 The
industry heralded the message that their designs deserved legal protection,
but no protection existed under common law.26 In 1913 the industry
secured the support of the Register of Copyrights, Thorvald Solberg, who
announced to Congress:
[A]n amendment to the copyright law is called for . . . to
secure the protection of ornamental designs for articles of
manufacture, to provide suitable remedies in case of
infringement, and to prescribe a sufficient but reasonably
economical registration in behalf of the numerous American
and foreign draftsmen engaged in the preparation of such
designs.27
The Register directed the attention of Congress to the “urgent need”
for legislation; he advised that copyright protection was an adequate
remedy and noted its success in France.28 This declaration came during the
decade when the American ready-made apparel industry was entering
million-dollar proportions.29
A first draft of proposed legislation was submitted to the House floor a
year later,30 and new drafts were submitted in 1916 and 1917.31 However,
the final draft was laid aside in 1917 when “war was engulfing the designs
of men and mice.”32 Unlike the French movement for copyright protection
during the French Revolution, design right legislation was unable to claim
the Congressional floor when the United States was at war. As one
contemporary observed, “[p]erhaps the country [in 1917] was not yet ready
to acknowledge that art was still art though applied to industry; for ‘Art’
stood for ‘Culture,’ something removed from workday life, and
fundamentally a snobbish attitude persisted towards trade.”33 This
resignation also could have been a reflection of the simplistic attitude that
Americans incorporated into their clothing designs, because a “factor
indicating that American women adapted rather than copied French,
German, or British fashions is the fairly simple nature of American
25

GOTSHAL, supra note 6, at 10.
Id.
27
Id. at 10–11.
28
Id. at 11.
29
Maurice A. Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L.J. 235, 236 (1944).
30
See GOTSHAL, supra note 6, at 15 (stating that Rep. William A. Oldfield introduced the first
measure on design registration in Congress).
31
Id. at 16–17.
32
Id. at 17.
33
Id.
26
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life . . . . When seen in one of the[] elegant American centers, the newest
fashions usually appeared somewhat outlandish.”34 It is possible that
American society inherently associated a practicality with the fashion it
created; this consciousness created a hesitation toward legally recognizing
the creations of fashion designers as art, and it shielded Congress’s eyes
from the wrongs felt by the designers who had the superior ability to unite
that consciousness with dress.
Once war ended and the United States economy strengthened, the
“most nearly successful” design bill was submitted to the House in 1926.35
This was the Vestal Bill, named after the bill’s designer, Chairman of the
House Committee on Patents Representative, Albert H. Vestal.36 An
ardent supporter of the Vestal Bill was Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover, who had recently felt obliged to decline when the United States
was invited to sponsor an American section in the International Exposition
of Modern Decorative and Industrial Art in Paris because the United States
“had no products of modern design fit to exhibit.”37 The Vestal Bill did
not simply cover fashion designs, but any “pattern, shape, or form of a
manufactured product.”38 After a series of amendments, the House passed
the Bill in 1930.39
The Vestal Bill received staunch opposition from department stores
who feared that retailers as a whole would face liability for selling
infringing goods.40 They feared that good-faith purchasers would be
hindered from selling their merchandise, that a copyright owner would
“[u]se his claim to club them into buying his goods at his price,” and that a
monopoly of fashion would develop in the hands of Paris designers.41 The
Bill lost its support as each industry realized their possible liability and
after numerous amendments, the Senate passed the Bill in 1935; however,
it was never acted upon again in the House.42 This is the last noteworthy
attempt at extending copyright protection to fashion designs before the
34
CAROLINE RENNOLDS MILBANK, NEW YORK FASHION: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STYLE
19 (1989).
35
Scafidi, supra note 2, at 119.
36
See GOTSHAL, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that Rep. Vestal had introduced the Bill in 1924).
37
Id. at 26.
38
Weikart, supra note 29, at 247.
39
Id. at 249.
40
GOTSHAL, supra note 6, at 30. American retailers remain opposed to extending copyright
protection to fashion design, including the IDPPPA. Cf. Innovative Design Protection and Piracy
Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 130–32 (2011) (letter from Stephanie Lester, Vice
President, International Trade, Retail Industry Leaders Assoc. to Rep. Goodlatte, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet) [hereinafter Letter from Stephanie
Lester] (expressing concerns for the IDPPPA on behalf of the Retail Industry Leaders Assoc.).
41
GOTSHAL, supra note 6, at 31.
42
Weikart, supra note 29, at 251.
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twenty-first century.
2. The Inability of the American Fashion Design Industry to Receive
Legal Redress in Court
One of the main proponents for the Silk Association’s rally-cry
brought a suit against a copier of one of their valuable silk designs under a
claim of unfair competition in Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Co.43 Every
season, Cheney Brothers invested a significant amount of money into its
designs, with the result that only about a fifth of its seasonal product
proved popular; furthermore, its value only lasted for a single season of
about eight or nine months.44 Cheney Brothers argued that the defendant’s
copying of its design was an act of unfair competition that devalued the
price of its goods.45
On its face, Cheney appeared to be a classic case of unfair competition.
In support of its claim, the plaintiff offered the Supreme Court’s decision
in International News Service v. Associated Press,46 which held that news
acquired through the efforts of the Associated Press did not become open
to public use when posted on bulletin boards to such an extent that
defendant International News Service, plaintiff’s rival, was allowed to take
such information and publish in competition.47 This case was particularly
relevant because news, like silk designs, was not copyrightable.48 Here,
the Court acknowledged that the seasonal nature of silk designs made an
application for a design patent impossible and that the plaintiff’s works
were not granted protection under federal copyright law.49
The Second Circuit, however, refused to extend the holding of
International News Service into the realm of industrial design. It held that
Cheney Brothers did not have an unfair competition cause of action against
a counterfeiter.50 Writing for the Court, Judge Learned Hand observed that
without Federal copyright protection “it is easy for any one to copy such as
prove successful, and the plaintiff, which is put to much ingenuity and
expense in fabricating them, finds itself without protection of any sort for
its pains.”51 And yet, (seemingly) fearing a slippery-slope, Judge Hand
quickly pushed aside the holding of International News Service by stating,
43

35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
Id. at 279.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 280 (citing Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)); see also Int’l
News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236 (reasoning that unfair competition must be viewed from a perspective
within the industry at issue and concluding that newspaper corporations thus have a property right to
the news they acquire).
47
Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 240–41.
48
Id. at 233.
49
Cheney Bros., 35 F.2d 279 at 280.
50
Id. at 280–81.
51
Id. at 279.
44
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“[w]e are to suppose that the court meant to create a sort of common-law
patent or copyright for reasons of justice. Either would flagrantly conflict
with the scheme which Congress has for more than a century devised to
cover the subject-matter.”52
Notably, Judge Hand did not end his opinion with the holding, but
instead concluded with this statement:
True, it would seem as though the plaintiff had suffered a
grievance for which there should be a remedy, perhaps by an
amendment of the Copyright Law, assuming that this does
not already cover the case, which is not urged here. It seems
a lame answer in such a case to turn the injured party out of
court, but there are larger issues at stake than his redress.
Judges have only a limited power to amend the law; when the
subject has been confided to a Legislature, they must stand
aside, even though there be an hiatus in completed justice.53
Judge Hand despairingly, and yet resoundingly, stated that this was a
wrong which could only be amended by Congressional action.
3. The Fashion Originators’ Guild of America (FOGA): The Fashion
Industry’s Attempt at Self-Regulation
After the failure of the Vestal Bill, and having been barred from relief
in the Courts after Cheney Brothers, the dress and textile manufacturers
developed internal means for solving their problem of copying. The most
successful regime of self-policing was establishment of the Fashion
Originators’ Guild of America (“FOGA”). Members of FOGA were
united by a “declaration of cooperation” under which signing retailers
pledged to only buy dresses that were originals.54 All protected designs
were registered to a registration bureau that signaled to fellow members
that the design received the Guild’s protection.55 The Guild ran a detective
system that monitored retail sales, discovered copies, and alerted member
retailers of possible violations.56 It also maintained a “piracy committee,”
under which an alleged copy would be “put on trial” and its manufacturer
given an opportunity to defend the article.57 By 1935, the “Declaration of
Cooperation” had 12,000 signatories and the Guild controlled
approximately 42% of sales of women’s dresses wholesaling for more than
$10.75 (approximately $175.83 today).58
52

Id. at 280.
Id. at 281.
54
Weikart, supra note 29, at 252.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 253.
53
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A resurgence of antitrust sentiment by the government toward
monopolistic ventures during the late New Deal era ended FOGA’s
success.59 In April 1936, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) began an
investigation into FOGA and determined that FOGA’s practices were a
restraint of trade.60 The FTC issued a cease and desist order against FOGA
in February of 1939, compelling the Guild to cease “coercing” its members
to only sell to signatories of their Declaration of Cooperation.61
FOGA appealed to the Second Circuit, where it was Judge Learned
Hand who once again quashed their attempts at legal remedy. 62 Citing
Cheney Brothers, Judge Hand stated “until the Copyright Office can be
induced to register such designs as copyrightable under the existing statute,
they fall into the public demesne without reserve. The Guild has therefore
no more excuse for preventing other dressmakers from copying one than
the other.”63 Judge Hand held that their attempt to gather all possible
reproductions of a dress design was an attempt to create a monopoly, and
thus the Guild was breaking the law.64 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed Judge Hand’s decision in 1941.65
The intellectual property landscape has not changed for the fashion
industry since this internal attempt at self-policing was shut down over
seventy years ago. These seventy years “encompassed major changes
within copyright law, including changes that significantly extended the
reach and power of intellectual property protection. Against this backdrop,
the relative absence of concern about intellectual property among fashion
industry firms and the stability of the legal framework is remarkable.”66
And yet, as Judge Hand concluded in Cheney Bros., “Congress might see
its way to create some sort of temporary right, or it might not . . . . Our
vision is inevitably contracted, and the whole horizon may contain much
which will compose a very different picture.”67 Ninety years later, the
dicta of Judge Hand has fallen upon deaf ears: the picture remains the
same.
59
See Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property
Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139, 152 (2008) (outlining the return of Progressive Era antitrust
sentiments to the government by 1938 and observing, “the Roosevelt recession of 1937–1938
convinced some members of the New Deal brain trust that the large business combines were
intentionally pushing the economy downward by laying off workers and limiting the extension of
capital”).
60
Weikart, supra note 29, at 254.
61
Id.
62
Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 81 (2d Cir. 1940).
63
Id. at 84.
64
Id. at 85.
65
Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
66
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1716 (2006).
67
Cheney Bros., 85 F.2d at 281.
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III. THE CONCEPTUAL HURDLES THAT HINDER THE EXTENSION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW TO FASHION DESIGN
Today, the United States fashion industry has annual sales of almost
$230 billion.68 This sales figure is the basis of the main arguments in
support of, and also against, the IDPPPA. Does this immense revenue
indicate that the industry thrives without intellectual property protection,
and therefore Congressional intervention is unnecessary? Or does it
instead signal the potential further impact that the industry could have on
the American economy if designers received the traditional benefits
afforded to copyright owners, i.e., the ability to recoup investment and
control the creation of derivative works?
This dichotomy exists because innovation in fashion design is difficult
to conceptually reconcile with the three primary tenets of intellectual
property law. The purpose of this Part is to analyze these three conceptual
hurdles, because the first step toward crafting a solution is articulating the
problem. First, what exactly is the definition of “fashion?” It is not easy
to apply intellectual property law in a practical setting when it is difficult
to even articulate the good that society wants to encourage. Second,
fashion design is intimately linked to the design’s functional purpose as an
article of clothing (a characteristic that is rejected by copyright law). This
relationship leads to problems of public choice: does society want to
encourage and reward the innovators in the industry, or does society
instead want to promote the “democratization” of fashion, which is the
creation of cheap and easily accessible high fashion? Knockoffs are an
integral part of that democratization, and are therefore at once productive
and unproductive. Third, it is difficult to articulate a temporal window for
fashion protection because fashion is both fleeting and cyclical. This
characteristic has been further distorted and exacerbated by modern
technology.
A. The Elusive Definition of “Fashion”
The definition of “fashion” is difficult to articulate because it depends
upon the preoccupations of the definer. From the perspective of a clothing
designer, a definition of “fashion” can be articulated as the actual designs
created by designers within the industry. “Fashion” is not clothing: it is
art. The original design itself embodies a “distinction between the general
68
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CB12-03, ADVANCE MONTHLY SALES FOR RETAIL & FOOD
SERVICES, DEC. 2011 tbl. 1 (2012). Some have projected the total to be even higher, at $340 billion.
See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4
(2011) (testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, Designer and Cofounder, Proenza Schouler) [hereinafter
Testimony of Lazaro Hernandez].
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category of clothing and the subcategory of fashion, which may be
understood as a seasonally produced form of creative expression.”69
Historically, these are the designs of Europe that were imported and
adapted by American stores.70 Today, works of “fashion” are the creations
of both the new talent and the professional designers who combine their
talents, their imagination, and their interpretation of the world around them
to create an article of clothing. Those who support the IDPPPA believe
that these designers are the true creators of “fashion” and that their designs
are the true innovations within the industry.71
If one widens the definitional lens, “fashion” can instead be defined
according to its functional purpose as an article of clothing: “fashion” is
simply the clothing that an individual chooses to wear. It is not an entity
distinct from and above the individual, but is instead a representation of the
individual herself.72 Historically, this definition can be traced to the
traditional simplistic attitude felt by the American populace toward fashion
design.73
However, the American consciousness no longer maintains a snobbish
attitude toward the clothing industry and no longer inherently associates
fashion with practicality.74 Furthermore, those who purport to express
their individual character through their clothing have a propensity to buy
new clothing because their current clothes feel outdated; clothing “can be a
manifestation of a desire to partake in the collective moment, to be in step
with society, or to be in touch with the present.”75 Therefore, when trying
69

Scafidi, supra note 2, at 122.
See MILBANK, supra note 34, at 19 (“There is no doubt that American women followed
European fashions throughout the nineteenth century, but the extent to which they relied on European
styles . . . will never be fully known.”).
71
See Testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, supra note 68, at 4 (“Fashion is different from basic
apparel. Our designs are born in our imaginations. We create something from nothing at all.”). Works
of fashion can be both original designs and “basic garments that compliment . . . original designs in [a]
collection.” Id.
72
See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 3, at 1164 (“Through fashion, people communicate and
express themselves. Fashionable individuals’ personal style is often describes as ‘unique’ or
‘inimitable’ . . . . Fashion goods provide a vocabulary. What consumers might value in fashion then is
the availability of a variety of goods to choose from, a proliferation of the number of meanings that can
be made.”).
73
See MILBANK, supra note 34, at 19 (“Another factor indicating that American women adapted
rather than copied French, German, or British fashions is the fairly simple nature of American
life . . . . By the middle of the nineteenth century it became very clear that the American version of
European fashions suited American temperaments and habits far more than the originals.”).
74
See Scafidi, supra note 2, at 126 (“[G]reater cultural recognition of fashion as a form of
creative expression and the diffusion of original design efforts across all levels of the industry have
increased sympathy toward fashion designers. . . . [I]t is no longer credible to claim that legal
protection for fashion design is somehow elitist, especially in light of the expansive copyright
protection enjoyed by other industries.”).
75
Hemphill & Suk, supra note 3, at 1164; see also id. at 1165 (“Thus we identify differentiation
as a desired goal in fashion. On the other hand, we also notice benefits of moving in a common
70
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to define “fashion” from the perspective of the individual, the definition of
“fashion” is actually the force that signals to an individual what they
should wear.
If one widens the definitional lens further and focuses upon the
industry as a whole, “fashion” can be defined as an element of consumer
behavior. “Fashion” is that temporal point where a new design is
expropriated by the masses and quickly turned into a “trend.”76 “Fashion”
is not the creative process of the fashion designer and it is not an individual
mode of expression: fashion design is a market industry and “fashion” is
the design that the consumer demands.
1. Multiple Definitions of “Fashion” Caused Conflicting Goals for
Intellectual Property Protection
These differing definitions of “fashion” have led to differing
conclusions about the relationship between fashion design and intellectual
property law. As a result, these divergent conclusions have formed the
primary arguments for and against the IDPPPA. Those who root their
definition of “fashion” in consumer behavior are against the extension of
any form of intellectual property law to fashion design. On the other hand,
those who believe that “fashion” is the cumulative result of a
professional’s creative process, and those who adhere to the definition that
“fashion” is a design that motivates individual behavior, support the
IDPPPA’s extension of copyright protection.
Those who support the existing unfettered right to copy root their
argument in a fear that the industry will be harmed economically if
copying was outlawed because they link the success of a design to the
consumerism that it inspires.77 They argue that the prevalence of copying
in the fashion industry does not harm the industry financially but actually
fuels its success.78 These supporters of the status quo primarily argue that
copying provides for accelerated diffusion of styles79 and lays the
foundation upon which a trend begins.80 Copying is beneficial to the
direction and partaking of the same trend . . . . The idea is well captured by Anna Wintour, editor of
Vogue, who noted that what is laudable in fashionable people is at once ‘looking on-trend and beyond
trend and totally themselves.’”).
76
See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 66, at 1722. While never providing an exact definition
of “fashion,” Raustiala and Sprigman craft their “piracy paradox” upon the relationship between new
designs and a degree of design coherence exemplified by trends. Id.
77
See id. (“In short, piracy paradoxically benefits designers by inducing rapid turnover and
additional sales.”).
78
See id. at 1691 (“[C]opying functions as an important element of—and perhaps even a
necessary predicate to—the apparel industry’s swift cycle of innovation.”).
79
See id. at 1722 (coining the phenomena “induced obsolescence” and concluding that “IP rules
providing for free appropriation of fashion designs accelerate the diffusion of designs and styles”).
80
See id. at 1728–29 (coining the phenomena “anchoring” and concluding that “copying helps to
anchor the new season to a limited number of design themes, which are freely workable by all firms in
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fashion industry because it allows for more rapid turnover of styles and
therefore yields additional sales; “the fashion cycle, in sum, is propelled by
piracy.”81
This argument is first bolstered with data that the most expensive
twenty percent of women’s dresses have grown more expensive since 1998
while all others have become cheaper or remained the same.82 Women’s
apparel as a whole has similarly become cheaper.83 This data can lead to
the conclusion that price growth for a fashion design must be “very
healthy” because one would normally expect cheap copies to depress the
price of its high-end original.84 Furthermore, the two forms of dresses lie
in different markets and not simply different percentiles; there is no
competition between the two because the woman who buys the $50 Chanel
copy would most likely be unable to afford the original if the copy did not
exist.85 Therefore, the availability of the copy fuels the desirability—and
thus the price—of the original designer’s creation.
Conversely, those who support the IDPPPA argue that copying stifles
innovation in the fashion design industry. They argue that there are
actually two different forms of “copying” in the fashion industry: one is the
general practice by designers of drawing freely upon the themes, styles and
ideas of their culture (“borrowing”), and the other is blatant copying for the
purpose of free riding on the design of another.86 These two forms are
distinguishable by their goals and effects.87 Proponents of this argument
advocate a form of copyright protection that prevents the blatant, freeriding copyists and protects the innovative members of the American
fashion culture by allowing for borrowing.88 This form of protection
the industry within the low-IP equilibrium” and that “[a] regime of free appropriation helps emergent
themes become full-blown trends; trendy consumers follow suit”).
81
Id. at 1726.
82
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 76
(2011) (oral testimony of Prof. Christopher Sprigman).
83
Id.
84
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
82–83 (2011) (prepared statement of Prof. Christopher Sprigman).
85
Id. at 84.
86
See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 3, at 1153 (“The model makes visible an important analytic
distinction that is useful for thinking about creative goodsthe distinction between close copying on
one hand and participation in common trends on the other. Design copying must be distinguished from
other forms of relation between two designs, which may go by any number of names including
inspiration, adaptation, homage, referencing, or remixing.”).
87
Id. at 1160.
88
See id. at 1153 (“Our theory leads us to favor a legal protection against close copying of fashion
designs. The proliferation of close copies of a design is not innovation . . . . It is importantly distinct
from the proliferation of on-trend designs that share common elements, inspirations, or references but
are nevertheless saliently different from each other. With respect to close copies, there is no reason to
reject the standard justification for intellectual property, that permissive copying reduces incentives to
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would not solely be a means of punishment but instead an incentive to
create.89 The only sellers who would have to adjust their businesses would
be those who sell knockoffs, and the only thing that retailers have to
monitor is that they are not selling knock-offs.90
Also, those who support the IDPPPA do so because they believe the
hypothesized pernicious economic effects are illusory and because the
IDPPPA’s extension of copyright protection, in their view, formally
acknowledges that there is a distinction between clothing and artistic
fashion.91 Such a change will allow for a period when a designer can
receive recognition and exclusive use of their artistic innovation, will
encourage the spread of ideas via borrowing while discouraging free riders,
and will permit designers to choose who sells their designs and thus
controls their image.
B. Problems of Public Choice
Just as a painting is in reality simply paint on a canvas, and a work of
literature is words on a page, what is produced through fashion design is an
article of clothing. This functional aspect of fashion design is the primary
reason why there is no copyright protection for such designs in the United

create.”); see also Oral Statement of Jeannie Suk, supra note 21, at 13 (“A key distinction to recognize
is the distinction between products that are inspired by a designer’s work and products that replicate or
knock off a designer’s work without any effort at modification. . . . This is a crucial difference as a
matter of innovation policy because knockoffs cannot plausibly claim to be forms of innovation,
whereas inspired-bys can. Knockoffs directly undermine the market for the original designs and reduce
the designer’s incentive to innovate in ways that inspired-bys do not.”).
89
See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 15
(2011) (prepared statement of Prof. Jeannie Suk) [hereinafter Prepared Statement of Jeannie Suk] (“The
goal of a law addressing copying in fashion design should indeed be to give an incentive to create, but
also to safeguard designers’ ability to draw upon a large domain of creative design influences to
participate in fashion trends.”).
90
See Oral Statement of Jeannie Suk, supra note 21, at 13–14 (“The IDPPPA is therefore a highly
moderate bill that only targets businesses that produce and sell knockoffs of original designs. The vast
majority of the apparel industry will not be affected. If retailers are not selling knockoffs, they have
nothing to fear from this bill. And even if they are, they are still safe if the design that they knock off is
in the public domain or is not itself original, or if they are unaware that the items that they sell are
knockoffs.”).
91
See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 8
(2011) (prepared statement of Lazaro Hernandez) [hereinafter Prepared Statement of Lazaro
Hernandez] (“This bill will make it easier for all designers, not just the big names, to make their
designs available at a variety of prices in a variety of stores. There are some in the industry who have
become comfortable with the status quo. They see no need for a new law and fear that they might have
to change the way they do business. To those companies I say, talk to all of the small designers put out
of business by your current practices and business models.”).
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States.
This functionality also raises a problem of public choice for
legislators: knockoffs in the clothing industry hold the unique position of
being both productive and unproductive. Copying in the fashion industry
decreases a designer’s return on investment, creates barriers of entry into
the design market, and distorts innovation. However, copyists also make
high-end fashion designs accessible to the general population. As a result,
when Congress debates the extension of copyright protection to fashion
design, the argument inevitably devolves into a debate over the best
situation in a Catch-22: should American law encourage and reward the
innovators in the fashion design industry, or does society instead want to
promote the “democratization” of fashion?
Knockoffs are unproductive because they prevent designers from
recouping the sizeable investment they put into creating the new design.
This problem only grows as technology advances, for the investment costs
alluded to in Cheney Brothers have reached million dollar proportions
today. Lazaro Hernandez, co-founder of Proenza Schouler, testified before
the House Subcommittee that it costs him $3.8 million to produce one
collection, and a single runway show typically costs about $320,000.93
These figures suggest that the “real issue [is] whether the law should allow
designers to ‘appropriate the benefit of their investment in research and
development (“R&D”) and product quality.’”94 Notably, data that the top
twenty percent of women’s dresses have increased in price has also led
some to the opposite conclusion: that copying forces designers to increase
their prices in order to recoup lost investment.95
Proponents of the IDPPPA argue that these ever-increasing R&D costs
particularly affect new designers and create a barrier to entry into the
market.96 Fashion products have traditionally been produced in a form
17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“[A] ‘useful article’ is an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian value function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article of
to convey information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful
article.’”); Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 66, at 1699 (“[T]he lack of protection flows from a more
general point of copyright doctrine: namely, the rule largely denying copyright protection to the class
of ‘useful articles,’ that is, goods, such as apparel, furniture, or lighting fixtures, in which creative
expression is compounded with practical utility.”).
93
Testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, supra note 68, at 4.
94
Monseau, supra note 4, at 27, 33.
95
See, e.g., Safia A. Nurbhai, Note, Style Piracy Revisited, 10 J.L. & Pol’y 489, 491 (2002)
(“Copying destroys the style value of dresses that are copied. Women will not buy dresses at a good
price at one store if dresses which look about the same are offered for sale at another store at half those
prices. For this reason, copying substantially reduces the number and amount of reorders which the
original creators get. With this uncertainty with respect to reorders, original creators cannot afford to
buy materials in large quantities as they otherwise would. This trend tends to increase the prices as
which they must be sold.” (internal citation omitted)).
96
See Testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, supra note 68, at 4–5 (“The most severe damage from
lack of protection falls upon emerging designers . . . . While salvage designers and large corporations
with wide recognized trademarks can better afford to absorb these losses caused by copying, very few
92
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described as a “fashion pyramid.” The top of the pyramid is filled by
haute couture, designer ready-to-wear apparel, “prestige collections” and
lower priced “bridge collections.”98 In the middle there exists the
moderately priced apparel and at the bottom are basic commodities.99
Therefore, a new designer must cope with both substantial R&D costs and
the inherent need to define herself as a creator within the industry’s unique
economic structure:
97

Every designer must develop their own DNA in order to
make a lasting and recognizable impact on consumers. It’s
like developing their “hit song” or anthem. Imagine if a
starting songwriter’s first song was stolen and recorded by
someone else with no credit to the songwriter and worse, it
becomes a hit. They hear it on the radio every day and they
are never credited. That’s what happens to many young
designers whose ideas are stolen and rendered by others. It’s
very hard to survive when you become the victim of this type
of theft.100
Proponents of the IDPPPA therefore contend that protection is needed
because innovation in the industry does not only occur amongst those who
sell the most expensive twenty percent of dresses.101 Copyists not only
exploit the R&D investments of established designers such as Proenza
Shouler but also have the ability to “wipe out young careers in a single
season.”102
Copyists also cut at the core of a fashion design because they dilute the
prestige of the brand copied. In trademark law, dilution is the gradual
erosion of the property value of the designer’s goodwill due to a similar
(albeit not identical) use by another.103 One form of a claim of dilution is
small businesses can compete with those who steal their intellectual capital. It makes it harder for
young designers to start up their own companies. And isn’t that the American Dream?”).
97
See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 66, at 1693–94 & fig.A (summarizing the “fashion
pyramid”).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Prepared Statement of Lazaro Hernandez, supra note 91, at 7.
101
See id. (“The most severe damage from lack of protection falls upon emerging designers . . . .
While established designers and large corporations with widely recognized trademarks can better afford
to absorb the losses caused by copying, very few small businesses can compete with those who steal
their intellectual capital.”).
102
Id.; see also Oral Statement of Jeannie Suk, supra note 21, at 14 (describing the particular
hardship lack of copyright protection causes upon emerging new designers).
103
See Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“Dilution is an
injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox confusion. Even in the absence of
confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by another’s use. This is the essence of dilution.
Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will
inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.”).
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“blurring,” which occurs when two items are so similar that one seems less
distinctive now that there are two of them.104 The other form of dilution is
“tarnishment,” which occurs when one mark is harmed by another use due
to negative imagery.105 Dilution is a particular problem in the fashion
industry because of the industry’s current reliance on trademark protection
and, combined with the advances in technology and interplay with Asia,
often the “main value of high-end fashion good is their brands and not their
design . . . particularly for accessories, the designer items may be no better
made than the copies.”106
An example of this problem was the situation that Burberry faced
when its trademarked plaid was adopted by Britain’s “underclass ‘chav’
culture, described as ‘label-conscious football hooligans.’”107 Sales in the
United Kingdom dropped because elites did not want to be associated
“with the person who mugged them.”108 This led one author to conclude
that “the core of the problem with fashion copying is not that exact copies
are replacing the original, but that close copies are reducing the value of
the original by reducing its prestige.”109 Therefore, those who rooted their
definition of “fashion” in consumer behavior were correct that copyists
allow for the development of a trend; however, both the reputation and the
revenue of the creator, Burberry, suffered a serious blow.
Finally, while the current intellectual property regime may not entirely
stifle innovation, it nevertheless distorts innovation.110 The current
intellectual property regime, which provides only trademark and trade
dress protection, “tends, if anything, to push fashion consumption and
production in the direction of status and luxury rather than more polyvalent
innovation.”111 Two distortions are ultimately observed: first, a trend
toward the creation of designs that are legally more difficult to copy,
notably designs that are dripping with logos and trademarked designs; and
second, designs that contain unusual or expensive materials or difficult
workmanship.112
104

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).
Id.
106
Erika Myers, Justice in Fashion: Cheap Chic and the IP Equilibrium in the United Kingdom
and the United States, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 47, 56 (2009). This was also a concern of the Subcommittee.
See Statement of Rep. Goodlatte, supra note 2, at 2 (“And because these knockoffs are usually of such
poor quality, they damage the designer’s reputation as well. Common sense dictates that we should
inhibit this activity by protecting original fashion works.”).
107
Myers, supra note 106, at 57.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 51.
110
See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 3, at 1179–80 (observing two ways in which the current
intellectual property regime has distorted innovations in the fashion industry and concluding that “[t]he
result of these distortions is to push creators toward the high-end realm of status and luxury, and away
from devoting creative resources to design innovation”).
111
Id. at 1179.
112
Id.
105
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These three detailed arguments for the passage of the IDPPPA are
countered with the general assertion that copyists are a strong social
equalizer. Copyists are able to quickly translate the designs of haute
couture into cheaper fabrics for sale to the American masses through retail
chains such as Forever 21. The elephant in the room with the House
Committee is the fact that if a change in the law were to prevent the
operation of stores like Forever 21, nothing would have changed for the
poor law student who is unable to afford the Burberry original. A classic
fear associated with the extension of copyright protection to fashion design
is the argument that the majority of the American public will be denied a
method of individual expression, and that such expression will instead be a
privilege reserved only for those with the means to afford the originals. 113
This is a frightening prospect for elected representatives.
Fashion designers have attempted to counter this fear with the
assertion that designers do not seek protection in order to achieve isolation,
but instead to gain the exclusive right “to have the chance to knock off
their own designs before others do it for them.”114 Designers argue that
they would never earn a profit by selling their designs only to a select
few.115 Instead, the main profit is accrued from affordable ready-to-wear
lines based upon their high-end originals. Copyists prevent this natural
business model from evolving, however, since with copyright protection,
“the average consumer can wear affordable new designs created by true
designers rather than poor copies of the real thing made by pirates in
China.”116
C. The Unique Temporal Life of a Fashion Design
“Fashion is made to become unfashionable.”117 A critical element of
protection for fashion design is capturing the moment when a new design
is original.118 For the designer, this entails the ability to capture the market

113
See, e.g., Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 111 (2011) (response to post-hearing questions from Prof. Jeannie Suk) (submitting for
written answer of each individual testifying in support of the IDPPPA the question “[i]f H.R. 2511
becomes law, are there industry standards in place that would govern licensing agreements between
newly empowered upstart designers and the manufacturers and retailers such that the consumers would
continue to have affordable options?”).
114
Testimony of Lazaro Hernandez, supra note 68, at 5.
115
See id. (“Designers don’t make a profit selling a small number of high-priced designs, but only
after they offer their own more affordable ready-to-wear lines based on their high-end collections.”).
116
Id.
117
ANTHONY ST. PETER, THE GREATEST QUOTATIONS OF ALL TIME 238 (2010) (quoting Coco
Chanel).
118
See Scafidi, supra note 2, at 125 (detailing the fashion cycle according to both economic and
sociological effects and observing that “[l]ess a method of discouraging copyists than a means of
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119

for the design created.
For the fashion industry as a whole, this entails
the period when the design is not only marketable but also viewed by
others as original.120 The timing of fashion design piracy, which is the
primary stimulus for passage of the IDPPPA,121 occurs right after the new
design has been shown because that is when the design is most valuable.122
The lifetime of a fashion design is temporally constructed in
accordance with the design’s ability to capture the trends of the season and
then influence the style of new designs. The typical copyright standard of
the lifetime of the creator plus one hundred years is impracticable for an
industry that desires to encourage borrowing and cyclical trends, and
therefore “given the highly seasonal and capricious nature of fashion, or
public tastes, the term of copyright for garment designs should be
limited.”123 A copyright regime for fashion design should be crafted to
match the industry’s unique temporal window, which is typically only a
few months. Furthermore, because use of a new design via borrowing is
what furthers innovation within the industry, a form of copyright
protection that extends beyond the design creator’s use could potentially
stifle innovation within the design field. Therefore, a shortened window of
protection is not only practicable, but also necessary for the economic and
innovative viability of the industry. However, factors that support a longer
term of protection are the existence of a time lapse between the first
showing of a design and its subsequent retail designs, and also the
sluggishness of some consumers to respond to new fashions.124
Proponents of the IDPPPA further note that the temporal element of
fashion design has been distorted by modern technology. The fashion
industry today is no longer marked by the same investment and

mitigating their effects, the fashion cycle is essentially a pattern of consumer behavior that luxury
goods industries can under limited circumstances leverage to create desire for new products.”).
119
See, e.g., Statement of Rep. Goodlatte, supra note 2, at 2 (“The production lifecycle for
fashion designs is very short. Once a design achieves popularity through a fashion show or other event,
a designer usually has a limited number of months to produce and market that original design.”).
120
See Prepared Statement of Lazaro Hernandez, supra note 91, at 7 (“When designers produce
basic garments to complement the original designs in our collections and create complete outfits, we
know the difference between what is new and what is based on a common template—and so do design
pirates.”).
121
See Statement of Rep. Goodlatte, supra note 2, at 2 (“But it is perfectly legal for [a design
pirate] to steal the design, reproduce the article of clothing, and sell it, provided he does not attach a
fake label to the finished product. This loophole allows pirates to cash in on the sweat equity of others
and prevents designers in our country from reaping a fair return on their creative investments.”).
122
See Rocky Schmidt, Comment, Designer Law: Fashioning a Remedy for Design Piracy, 30
UCLA L. REV. 861, 877 & n.118 (1983) (proposing a one-year term of protection because “garment
designs are still of most value when new, and therefore most design piracy occurs soon after a design
has been shown”).
123
Id. at 877.
124
Id. at 877 n.118.
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125

development strategies that defined it in the past.
The outsourcing of
clothing production to Asia has allowed for rather high-quality counterfeits
to be produced rapidly and cheaply.126 Furthermore, advancements in
photography, television, and the Internet have accelerated the speed at
which a new fashion design can evolve from the runway to the shelf of a
counterfeiter.127 All of this often occurs faster than the designer can stock
their own shelf with Italian-made wares and inevitably undercuts the
designer’s investment costs.128 This leads advocates to assert that if
designers did not require protection in the past, they do now.129
D. Resolving the Discrepancies
Copyright law does not extend only to those books that prove to be
classics, and patent law does not protect only those inventions that prove to
earn millions. These regimes strive to protect and encourage all forms of
innovation. While some designers have found protection from blatant
copyists with trademark law, trademark protection has had the effect of
distorting innovation and alienating young talent. Therefore, “fashion”
should be defined from the perspective of the industry’s designers; it
should not be defined according to the individual and consumer behaviors
of the design’s future market.130
The pernicious effects of copyists are numerous and particularized; the
status quo is supported by a singularized economic analysis and a
generalized fear of change. There is no articulated reason for why
Congress should assume that the democratization of fashion design would
no longer occur should the original designers hold a temporary copyright.
Therefore, the public policy concerns which have historically blocked the
extension of copyright law to fashion designs should no longer hold the
spotlight.
125
See Scafidi, supra note 2, at 125 (describing how the traditional movement of high fashion
trends from high-status individuals to a broader consumer base is “rendered obsolete” by modern
capabilities of rapidly producing and distributing knock-offs).
126
Id. at 125–26.
127
Id. at 125.
128
See Monseau, supra note 4, at 29 (“The most common criticisms are that Raustiala and
Sprigman underestimate the new technologies of copying, and they misunderstand the effect of various
other changes in the fashion business, especially the motivations and buying habits of customers. The
speed of global communication with factories in China, which are ready and able to execute
commissions from fashion design pirates, has significantly affected the dynamics of the business.”).
129
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430–31 (1984).
(“Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.”).
130
See Jennifer Mencken, A Design for the Copyright of Fashion, 1997 B.C. INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. F. 1, 6–7 (1997), available at http://bciptf.org/tag/1997 (“The mere fact that an industry has been
able to devise other methods of up-keeping its financial stability should not be a reason to deny creative
expression protection.”).
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A copyright system that can effectively reconcile the competing
interests of fashion designers, consumers, and retailers is one that does not
define its boundaries according to either time or subject matter, but instead
is limited by context. The divergent arguments of designers, retailers and
consumers exemplify that the context of designs is numerous and often
functional. However, a copyright system that carves out a form of
protection for fresh art within the design context has the potential to protect
the innovators of the fashion design industry, while also serving the public
interest.
IV. THE POTENTIAL OF THE INNOVATIVE DESIGN PROTECTION & PIRACY
PREVENTION ACT
H.R. 2511, titled the Innovative Design Protection & Piracy Prevention
Act, was submitted to the House of Representatives’ Committee on the
Judiciary on July 13, 2011.131 If passed, this Act will create a sui generis
copyright system for fashion design.132 Particularly, the Act will fit
protection for fashion design into Chapter 13 of Title 17 of the U.S.C.,
which is a sui generis copyright system that was created for boat hulls in
1998.133 The IDPPPA is the cumulative result of decades of lobbying and
five years of prior attempted legislation in Congress.
The purpose of this Part is to outline the IDPPPA’s proposed copyright
regime. The IDPPPA effectively copes with the design industry’s legal
history and unique characteristics by carving out a form of contextualized
protection for artistic innovation in the field of fashion design. The
IDPPPA is a viable system of copyright protection for fashion designs;
however, in order to alleviate the risk of increased litigation, the statute
should shorten the two-year registration window established in 17 U.S.C.
§ 1310134 instead of eliminating it altogether, and the statute should define
what design alterations constitute changes that are “merely trivial,” and
thus infringing.
A. Designs Protected
As discussed earlier in this Note, there is a distinction between
clothing and the seemingly nebulous, higher creation of “fashion.”135 If
Congress is to successfully protect investment in fashion design and
encourage innovation, it must protect those designers who move beyond
the role of selling clothing to the masses and instead create and define what
131

Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011).
Id.
133
Id.; Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1310 (2006).
134
Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1310(a) (2006).
135
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
132
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the masses crave to buy. As the statute currently stands, H.R. 2511 applies
an objective “entire package” approach to the protection of an article of
clothing by extending protection only to the “appearance as a whole . . .
including its ornamentation.”136 Furthermore, for an entire appearance to
be protected, it must have “original elements,” an “original arrangement,”
or “non-original elements as incorporated in the overall appearance of the
article of apparel that are the result of the designer’s own creative endeavor
and provide a unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian
variation over prior designs for similar types of articles.”137 The copyright
protection proposed under the IDPPPA is therefore much more limited
than the traditional copyright standard and also more limited than the sui
generis system created for boat hulls.138
Practical application of this standard to fashion design will leave a
significant majority of clothing produced in the United States unprotected.
The language that protection will be extended only to an “entire
appearance, including ornamentation” entails that protection will only be
provided to a garment in its entirety. For example, a novel use of buttons
will not receive copyright protection. Such a creative design would only
receive protection if it transformed the whole article of clothing that the
buttons were used upon. Furthermore, it would only be that article in its
entirety—not the buttons themselves—that would have protection against
copyists. Therefore, one can infer from this standard that a fellow designer
could incorporate those novel buttons into her own work so long as her
final product does not resemble that of the copyright holder’s.
The definition of “originality” in the IDPPPA is also much narrower
than the traditional copyright standard.139 When taken in light of the
general nature of fashion design,140 and recent court decisions, it is very
136

Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(B)

(2011).
137

Id. (emphasis added).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (protecting with copyright any “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression”); see also Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1301
(2006) (extending protection to all vessel hulls without any strict originality limitations).
139
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) (noting that the traditional copyright standard for
“original works of authorship . . . does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit,
and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them”).
140
See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 3, at 1155 (“Fashions change. Styles emerge, become
fashionable, and are eventually replaced by new fashionable styles.”); see also Innovative Design
Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property,
Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 128 (2011) (written
testimony of Kurt Courtney, Manager, American Apparel & Footwear Association) [hereinafter
Written Testimony of Kurt Courtney] (“Overall, original fashion designs are not very common, since
most apparel and footwear companies reuse, recast and reformat older designs for new collections,
especially in the mass market. . . . [G]eneric fashion articles, such as t-shirts, pleated pants and buttondown collared shirts will not be considered as original or infringing, since they are very welldocumented items that have been seen in fashion for decades.”).
138
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likely that this standard will be interpreted as a requirement of extreme
novelty, and therefore a wide majority of new designs will not be
copyrightable. For example, the Southern District of New York stated in
in Christian Louboutin, S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America, that no
creation in the fashion industry is truly “novel.”141 The court also
articulated a genuine fear that courts may become “arbiters of fashion” and
a pointed desire to avoid such a characterization.142 Therefore, designers
will face a heavy burden should they seek to copyright their creations and a
serious fight should they wish to bring a claim of infringement. The
benefit of this specter, however, is that it cuts against the fears of the retail
industry that the IDPPPA would lead to immense litigation.143 It also has
the potential benefit of spurring further innovation in fashion design.144
The negative implication of this standard is that the initial burden
placed upon designers disproportionately favors well-established designers
with more economic resources than start-up designers with less economic
resources. 145 This should be considered a serious issue because one of the
main goals of the IDPPPA is to protect start-up designers, who suffer more
dire consequences from copyists than designers who can fall back on
141
See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d, No. 11-3303, 2012 WL 3832285 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (“Sometime around
1992 designer Christian Louboutin had a bright idea. He began coloring glossy vivid red the outsoles
of his high fashion women's shoes. Whether inspired by a stroke of original genius or, as competitor
YSL retorts, copied from King Louis XIV's red-heeled dancing shoes, or Dorothy's famous ruby
slippers in ‘The Wizard of Oz,’ or other styles long available in the contemporary market—including
those sold by YSL Christian Louboutin deviated from industry custom.”).
142
See id. at 456 (“Or they could go to court and ask for declaratory relief holding that a proposed
red sole is not close enough to Chinese Red to infringe Louboutin's mark, thereby turning the judge into
an arbiter of fashion design. Though Qualitex points out that in trademark disputes courts routinely are
called upon to decide difficult questions involving shades of differences in words or phrases or
symbols, the commercial contexts in which the application of those judgments generally has arisen has
not entailed use of a single color in the fashion industry, where distinctions in designs and ideas
conveyed by single colors represent not just matters of degree but much finer qualitative and aesthetic
calls.”).
143
See, e.g., Letter from Stephanie Lester, supra note 40, at 130 (expressing concerns for the
IDPPPA on behalf of the Retail Industry Leaders Assoc. and stating that “[t]he so-called ‘heightened’
pleading requirements would not prevent lawsuits/trials”).
144
See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
106 (2011) (response to post-hearing questions by Prof. Jeannie Suk) (“The reward of copyright
protection for designs that meet the Act’s standard would likely spur some innovative designers to
attempt to meet [the new] standard with some of their designs. These attempts in response to the new
law may increase the percentage of such designs in the market, and thus increase the percentage of
designs eligible for copyright protection. This would be a desirable result, as it would in effect mean
an increase of design innovation in the fashion industry. Nevertheless, the standard under H.R. 2511 is
demanding.”).
145
See, e.g., Monseau, supra note 4, at 28, 52 (critiquing an earlier version of H.R. 2511 and
observing in particular “House Bill 2196 gives too much power to the well-financed and legally savvy
designer who has registered her design”).
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trademark and trade dress protection. However, the designers who testified
before the House Subcommittee predicted that the majority of protected
designs would actually be found in small boutique stores, therefore
suggesting that designers themselves do not fear such consequences.146
Also, the issue arises when designers bring their copyrights to court in
infringement suits, and unfortunately imbalanced access to the American
court system is a problem that plagues the legal system beyond the realm
of copyright infringement litigation.
B. Infringement System
The Congressional movements to extend copyright protection to
fashion design have revolved around attempts to develop a sui generis
infringement system comparable to the general copyright infrastructure. 147
The IDPPPA is no different. A major benefit of establishing an
infringement system is that it harmonizes with the rest of Title 17,
particularly Congress’s most recent sui generis system, boat hulls.
The primary argument against the establishment of an infringement
system in the United States is that a similar system established in the
European Union has not proven very successful. EU members are afforded
twenty-five years of design protection if the creator registers his design and
three years of protection should the creator not register his design.148
Designs are protected if they simply achieve a “copyright-like standard of
originality,”149 and designs are only prohibited when an informed user can
find almost no difference between the two designs in question.150 Since
these low standards were implemented, there has proven to be very little
changes to the EU’s fashion industry, and copyists remain prevalent.151
This has led at least one academic to conclude that the fashion industry
prefers the status quo to heightened intellectual property protection.152 The
See Written Testimony of Kurt Courtney, supra note 140, at 128 (“I do not envision that you
would find an original article of clothing or footwear . . . in a big retail establishment. I would expect
most original items to be found in smaller boutique stores.”).
147
See Copyright Registrations of Designs: Hearings Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong.
1–6 (1930) (creating a new statutory scheme for design protection similar to that of the existing
copyright structure); H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009) (extending copyright protection to designs by
amending Title 17, specifically).
148
Monseau, supra note 4, at 60–61.
149
Id. at 59 (“A design has ‘individual character’ if the overall impression the design produces on
the informed user differs from the overall impression produced on such a user by any design that has
previously been made available to the public.”).
150
Id.
151
See, e.g., Myers, supra note 106, at 71–72 (comparing the US-based company Forever 21 with
the UK-based company TopShop). Myers observes that the two companies still have the same business
model and that nothing has really changed in the UK compared to the U.S. even though the UK
provides IP protection to the fashion industry. Id.
152
See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 66, at 1735 (“Yet, we do not see evidence, in either the
form of lawsuits or the absence of design copying, that the behavior of the fashion industry firms
146
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majority of fashion design advocates nevertheless promote some form of
intellectual property protection for fashion design in the United States.153
I propose the idea that the lack of change in the European Union may
be a result of the fact that the United States does not participate in the
protection. There exists little incentive for fashion designers to invest the
resources in litigating against a fast-fashion chain in the UK, and little
return on investment when the same design could continue to be copied in
the American market.154 Furthermore, this lack of activity in the UK could
also serve as a signal to those against the IDPPPA who argue that
increased litigation is an inevitable result of copyright protection. The
right to litigate for infringement might actually be a secondary goal of
fashion designers in their fight to achieve the right to copyright.
A factor indicating that an infringement system might work favorably
for the American fashion industry, in comparison to the European fashion
industry, is that it has significant similarities to FOGA. Under FOGA, an
article of clothing that received protection under the Declaration of
Cooperation was “put on trial” when an alleged infringer was accused. 155
This system received significant support within the fashion community and
only ended on account of government intervention.156
Therefore,
imposition of a similar infringement system has the potential to once again
prove successful.
1. Practical Application Through the IDPPPA
The IDPPPA specifically defines an infringing article as an article that
is “copied” from the design itself or from an image of the design.157 An
article of clothing is deemed “not copied” if the article is “not substantially
identical” or was “the result of independent creation.”158 The majority of
changes much from one side of the Atlantic to the other. This observation suggests that the industry’s
practices with respect to design copying are not sensitive to changes in legal rules, and that the industry
chooses to remain within a low-IP regime even where the nominal legal rules are the opposite.”).
153
See, e.g., Myers, supra note 106, at 74 (“Despite the much stronger IP protection, the
responses of U.K. designer brands to cheap-chic chains have been similar to responses in the U.S..
Although IP protection does seem to have led to more innovation in U.K. cheap chic, as the chains have
found ways around the legal protection, the IP laws have had no apparent effect on the overall level of
innovation by designer labels. Indeed, such an effect would be somewhat surprising, given that the
level of copying seems to be approximately as high in the U.K. as in the U.S.”).
154
See also Monseau, supra note 4, at 34 (“Consumerism and the public appetite for named
designers as well as brand-named clothing and accessories are the drivers of the increasingly global
business of fashion. Many consumers buy clothing and accessories not so much out of necessity, but
for those less tangible product attributes and benefits. . . . To survive, the global and complex business
of fashion must constantly produce and determine how to market new designs.”).
155
Weikart, supra note 29, at 252.
156
Id. at 254.
157
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(e)(2)
(2011).
158
Id.
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fashion litigation will presumably center on determining whether the
alleged infringing work is “substantially identical” to the copyrighted
design. H.R. 2155 defines “substantially identical” as an article that is “so
similar in appearance as to be likely to be mistaken for the protected
design” or only contains differences that are “merely trivial.”159
Practically, this standard for determining infringement places a heavy
burden on designers (similar to the standard for establishing the design
itself as copyrightable). It is possible that this standard has the potential to
achieve Congress’s goal and successfully prevent only blatant copying.
There is no language narrowing the requirement “so similar in appearance
as to be likely to be mistaken for the protected design” to the eyes of a
professional designer.160 It is instead a standard catered toward a
traditional jury. This has the benefit of preventing a battle of the experts
but also has the negative potential of leading to uncertainty and a broader
spectrum of infringing designs.
C. Recommendations: A Need to Further Tailor the Scope of Protection
The IDPPPA copes with the unique temporal window of fashion
designs by limiting copyright protection to three years.161 I believe that
this sole adjustment is inadequate because it does not fully address the
ways by which the temporal factor pervades all aspects of fashion design; a
three-year window of protection neither signals to the industry what
exactly is protected nor defines for a jury what is considered original
within the industry.162 These weaknesses can be alleviated, however, if a
registration requirement and a definition of “trivial” are incorporated into
the IDPPPA.
1. Registered Design Right
The IDPPPA does not impose a registration requirement on fashion
designers. The IDPPPA specifically removes the Vessel Hull Act’s twoyear registration requirement from the purview of fashion designs.163 In
lieu of such a requirement, copyright protection is afforded to any
qualifying design the instant the design is “made public.”164 A registration
159

Id. § 2(a)(2).
See id. (lacking language clarifying who would likely confuse article for its similarity).
161
Id. § 2(d).
162
See supra Part III.C.
163
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(d)
(2011); 17 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (2006).
164
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(d)
(2011); 17 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1310(b) (2006) (providing that a design is made
public “when an existing useful article embodying the design is anywhere publicly exhibited, publicly
distributed, or offered for sale or sold to the public by the owner of the design or with the owner's
consent”).
160
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requirement has the potential to adversely affect new designers,165 and
those who opine on these potential adverse effects tend to further note the
existence of an unregistered design right in the EU.166 However, the
IDPPPA should include a short registration requirement because a
registration system affords certainty that encourages borrowing and has the
potential to alleviate the current fears of the American retail industry.167
Required registration provides public notice that a design is
copyrightable. This is a benefit for retailers because retailers will have
notice of what designs to look out for when selecting their next season of
apparel to stock, whether they import their products or produce them
domestically.168 Retailers would not be disadvantagedas might be the
case if unregistered designs could rise out of the etherbut instead would
be on a level playing field with any designer or producer who sought to
create inexpensive and stylish clothing. Also, the IDPPPA’s goal of
maximizing innovative borrowing could be stifled if designers are
uncertain that the design they are adapting is protected by copyright. A
registration requirement allows a designer to proactively capture access to
the design’s future market and signal to other designers that the work is
original.
The IDPPPA should instead shorten the two-year registration
requirement as reflected in the Vessel Hull Act. A two-year window for
registration is comparable with neither the limited three-year protection
granted under the IDPPPA,169 nor with the fast and cyclical nature of the
fashion industry.170 The purpose of a three-year window of protection is
that it is comparable with the fleeting and cyclical nature of the use of a
fashion design; it is a reflection of the short amount of time it takes for a
design to debut, be sold, and retire to non-use. Providing a two-year
window for registration has the potential to make the scope of protection
165
See Monseau, supra note 4, at 48 (“One of the main difficulties of drafting a law to protect
innovation in fashion design is to ensure that, while it protects investment in new design, it avoids the
Court’s concern about competition and so does not preclude others from designing products that follow
a new trend.”).
166
See id. at 71 (outlining possible negative effects of a copyright system dependent upon
registration).
167
See Letter from Stephanie Lester, supra note 40, at 131 (“Most major apparel, footwear, and
accessories retailers also have a hand in the design process on many of the products they purchase,
including, but not limited to, products bearing the brands they own and license. Even minor
involvement in the design process would likely trigger claims that the retailer induced its supplier to
produce the allegedly infringing product.”).
168
Id.
169
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(d)
(2011).
170
See, e.g., Statement of Rep. Goodlatte, supra note 2, at 2 (“The production lifecycle for
fashion designs is very short. Once a design achieves popularity through a fashion show or other event,
a designer usually has a limited number of months to produce and market that original design.”).
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too uncertain and too long.
An amendment requiring registration within a couple months of
showing a new fashion should be feasible for designers because they
typically only show their collections for one season. A shortened window
would also alleviate the retail industry’s fear of unanticipated and
unpredictable liability.171 Furthermore, there is little risk that a short
registration period will prove to be a trap for the unwary because designers
should know better: when designers display their work in a show or a store,
they are opening it up for the world to see and therefore are inviting
copyists.
2. Definition of “Trivial”
Congress should define “trivial” within the IDPPPA. The IDPPPA has
no definition for this key term and its current uncertainty has the strong
potential to lead to jury confusion and increased litigationa problem that
preoccupies Congress.172 It is also very likely that courts would interpret
“trivial” very narrowly if left to their own devices.173 I suggest that the
definition for a “trivial” change is “a change that is not the product of
creative skill and endeavor as reflected by the state of the art at the time the
design was created, such that a jury is unable to discern a modicum of
creativity to distinguish the two editions.” This language is borrowed from
the IDPPPA’s definition of “fashion design.”174 This definition is also a
reflection of precedent in the field of copyrightable music, which is an
171
See Letter from Stephanie Lester, supra note 40, at 131 (“Retailers would potentially have to
devote significant time, costs and research to ensure that each product they sell would not infringe upon
a protected design–not only at the time of design, but again when the garments are imported and sold
(which generally occurs several months later).”).
172
See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong.
§§ 2(a)(2), (e) (2011) (using the qualifying language “trivial” in both the proposed definition for a
protected fashion design and standard for infringement); see also Statement of Rep. Goodlatte, supra
note 2, at 2 (providing extensive examples for why the IDPPPA “does not encourage harassing or
litigious behavior”).
173
The Second Circuit’s reversal of the lower court’s holding in Christian Louboutin indicates the
tumult that even the issue of color can cause in the courts. Compare Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves
Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d, No. 11-3303, 2012 WL
3832285 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (holding that Louboutin’s red sole is not entitled to trademark
protection “even if it has gained enough public recognition in the market to have acquired secondary
meaning” because “in the fashion industry color serves ornamental and aesthetic functions vital to
robust competition”), with Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holdings, Inc., No.
11-3303, 2012 WL 3832285, at *13–14 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (“We hold that the lacquered red
outsole, as applied to a shoe with an ‘upper’ of a different color, has come to identify and distinguish
the Louboutin brand, and is therefore a distinctive symbol that qualifies for trademark protection. We
further hold that the record fails to demonstrate that the secondary meaning of the Red Sole Mark
extends to uses in which the sole does not contrast with the upper–in other words, when a red sole is
used on a monochromatic red shoe.” (citations omitted)).
174
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong.
§ 2(a)(2) (2011).
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industry that contains elements of borrowing.
As an example, the
inherent nature of clothing retail leads to the conclusion that a “trivial”
change would be a change of fabric (most likely for a cheaper fabric).
V. CONCLUSION
Almost a century ago, courts told Congress that copying was unfair
and economically harmful to the industrial design industries. They sent a
message to the fashion industry, copyists, and Congress that only Congress
could provide an equitable remedy under the Constitution. Almost seventy
years ago, Congress and our courts told the fashion industry that they
couldn’t police and protect their designs internally. Today, the fashion
industry’s hands are tied. This situation is particularly damaging for those
trying to enter the industry.
Congress should extend a limited form of copyright protection to
fashion design. The victory of achieving the Congressional recognition
that fashion design is worthy of copyright protection, and signaling to the
world that the United States will now step in to stop blatant copying in the
industry, weighs against the opposition’s counter-arguments. The status
quo has proven imperfect for those who actually participate in the industry,
the hypothesized pernicious economic effects are merely speculative, and
the fear of increased litigation is unjustified when the exact words of the
statute are analyzed.
The IDPPPA provides a viable solution to the problem of copying in
the fashion industry because it has the potential to limit protection to only
those works that are truly considered novel. I propose that two changes
should be made to the IDPPPA in order to make it a more viable statute:
first, the window for registration should be shortened instead of eliminated
altogether; and second, Congress should define “trivial” change.
It was a fashion designer, Coco Chanel, who once observed, “those
who create are rare; those who cannot are numerous. Therefore, the latter
175
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (“His
contribution consists of an introduction; a repetition of the same theme in the breaks; several bars of
harmony; and an ending. All this involved was the addition of certain inconsequential melodic and
harmonic embellishments such as are frequently improvised by any competent musician. One expert
testified that the introduction added by plaintiff was as commonplace among musicians as the fairy
story beginning, ‘Once upon a time.’ These same bars and developments thereof were repeated
throughout the song as breaks and as an ending. Such technical improvisations which are in the
common vocabulary of music and which are made every day by singers and other performers, are de
minimis contributions and do not qualify for copyright protection.”); see also Grove Press Inc. v.
Collectors Publ’n Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (“Plaintiff made approximately forty
thousand changes from the Verlag copy in producing its edition. These changes consisted almost
entirely of elimination and addition of punctuation, changes of spelling of certain words, elimination
and addition of quotation marks, and correction of typographical errors. These changes required no
skill beyond that of a high school English student and displayed no originality. These changes are
found to be trivial.”).

2012]

PROTECTING THE SEASONAL ARTS

317

are stronger.”
The goal of American intellectual property law is to
protect those who create, to foster their success, and to provide an
incentive for others to share their creations with the rest of American
society. American fashion designers have long been considered artists
within American culture.
In a Congressional term marked by
revolutionary changes in intellectual property law, the time is ripe for
Congress to finally acknowledge that a problem exists within a major
economic industry and to provide the limited remedy that has been made
available through the IDPPPA.
176
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CAROL TURKINGTON, THE QUOTABLE WOMAN 46 (2000) (quoting Coco Chanel).
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